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CASES NOTED
balance between the rights of a secured party and a subsequent buyer
in sections 9-306 and 9-307, and to engraft into either section, by judicial
interpretation, requirements that are not there, upsets this balance. The
proper result in Swift should not be accepted blindly. An understanding
of the concepts underlying sections 9-306 and 9-307 is essential to their
proper application.
ADAM K. LLEWELLYN
THE RIGHT TO LIGHT: DUE PROCESS AND
PUBLIC UTILITY TERMINATION
Colorado gas and electric customers sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, as well as money damages, against a privately owned Colorado
public utility company. Their complaint in the federal district court
charged that the company had violated the customers' rights to proce-
dural due process by unlawfully terminating their gas and electric service
without a hearing or without providing for one. Plaintiffs contended that
the public utility's termination of service involved state action within the
purview of the Civil Rights Acts,1 and thus gave federal jurisdiction over
the basic dispute. The company maintained that its policy of terminating
service for failure to pay bills did not involve state action, and, therefore,
that the customers did not have a claim for the taking of property with-
out due process. The United States District Court for the District of
Colorado, refusing to grant the motion to dismiss,' held: The actions of
a privately owned public utility operating under close supervision of the
state public utilities commission and supplying service under an exclusive
franchise from the state are "state action" under the purview of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970). Hattell v. Public Service Co., 350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo.
1972).
1. The Civil Rights Acts are 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
Section 1983 provides a cause of action in the event a state contravenes the Constitution.
The act states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) provides federal district courts with jurisdiction to redress deprivation
under color of state law of any right secured by the Constitution. Section 1343(3) reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person: . . . (3) To redress the deprivation, under
color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by
any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States. . ..
2. The claim for money damages, however, was dismissed. It was asserted under state
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It is well settled that the operations of governmentally owned and
operated public utility concerns, such as gas, electric and water com-
panies, constitute state actions.' Hattell, however, is one of a growing
number of federal court decisions4 which have held that the practices of
privately owned by publicly regulated utility companies may be "state
action" under the Civil Rights Acts and, thus, subject to due process
limitations. The basis for the decision in Hattell and similar cases lies
in the interpretation of what constitutes "state action" under the Civil
Rights Acts. In Adickes v. S. H. Kress,' the Supreme Court pointed out
two elements that were necessary in order to establish a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has
deprived him of a right secured by the "Constitution and laws" of the
United States. Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived
him of this constitutional right under color of state law.
It is well settled that it is a violation of the fourteenth amendment
for a state to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."6 However, several lower federal courts had felt that
the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) was limited to circumstances
wherein deprivation of personal liberties was alleged.7 Thus, "while prop-
erty rights and rights of personal liberty are entitled to the procedural
protections provided by due process, only the latter could be asserted in
§ 1983 civil rights actions."8
This personal liberty versus property right distinction can be attrib-
uted to Justice Stone's concurring opinion in Hague v. C.I.O.9 In Hague,
Justice Stone proposed that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) be
limited to deprivation of "personal liberty" and not include infringement
of property rights. For thirty-three years the Supreme Court neither for-
mally adopted nor rejected this distinction, and the full parameters of
jurisdiction under section 1343 (3) remained ambiguous.
Any question as to whether a civil rights action under section 1343
lay only for alleged deprivation of personal rights was finally put to rest
by the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.10 In Lynch,
law only. The district court, which would have had at most pendent jurisdiction, dismissed
the claim in the interest of both avoiding needless decisions of state law, and fairness to
litigants. 350 F. Supp. at 246.
3. E.g., Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
4. Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972); Bronson v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346
F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972); Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio
1972).
5. 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1969).
6. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. See, e.g., Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Inst'n., 436 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1970), vacated
and remanded 405 U.S. 1036 (1972).
8. Thrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 568 (8th Cir. 1972), citing Ihrke
v. Northern States Power Co., 328 F. Supp. 404, 407 (D. Minn. 1971) [hereinafter referred
to as Ihrke].
9. 307 U.S. 496, 518 (1939) [hereinafter referred to as Hague].
10. 405 U.S. 538 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Lynch].
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the court rejected the distinction between personal liberties and propri-
etary rights as a limitation on the scope of jurisdiction under section 1343.
"Neither the words of § 1343(3) nor the legislative history of that pro-
vision distinguishes between personal and property rights."'' The Lynch
opinion suggested an additional reason for rejecting the property rights
limitation: specifically, that personal liberties and proprietary rights were
interdependent and indistinguishable.
Decisions rendered in Stanford v. Gas Service Co.,12 Palmer v.
Columbia Gas Co.,' 3 and Bronson v. Consolidated Edison" are in accord
with the Hattell reasoning that public utility termination practices con-
stitute "state action" within the purview of the Civil Rights Acts. How-
ever, unlike Hattell, these cases did not rely upon Lynch and simply
avoided or loosely construed any distinction between proprietary inter-
ests and personal rights. The decisions in these cases evolved from the
respective courts' recognition of the changing concept of property. 15
It has been suggested that not all "rights" or "entitlements" requir-
ing due process protection have been stated. 6 The entitlement doctrine
had been developed by the court to protect interests variously denomi-
nated as "statutory entitlements" or "important interests."' 7 Welfare
benefits, 8 drivers licenses,' 9 and unemployment compensation,20 by no
means common law property forms, are among those areas that have
been characterized as entitlements and thus fall within the broad defini-
tion of property to be protected by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The Stanford, Palmer, and Bronson courts recognized
that public utility services-specifically heat, water, gas, and electricity
-were necessities of life and that termination of these utility services
also constituted a taking of a "right" or an "entitlement."
The critical issue in Hattell and related cases, however, was whether
termination policies of privately owned public utility firms was "state
action" within the meaning of section 1983. Clearly, all persons are sub-
ject to some degree of state regulation, but it is contrary to the intent of
section 1983 to label all such entities and activities as "state action."
The Supreme Court has applied the term only on a case by case basis and
11. Id. at 543.
12. 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Stanford].
13. 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Palmer].
'14. 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Bronson].
15. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Distinctions between con-
ventional property interests, traditionally protected by due process, and governmental "priv-
ileges" are being abolished. The latter group, if classified as an entitlement, may also have
to be afforded due process protection.
16. Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, 719 (D. Kan. 1972), citing McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 255 (1971) (Justice Brennan dissenting).
17. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
18. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
19. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
20. See California Human Resources Dept. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
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has never formulated an exact definition.' Consequently, "state action"
is a factual determination in each case.
Federal courts have generally held that when a private concern per-
forms a public function and is subject to public regulation, the conduct
may generally be characterized as "under color of law or state action."
In Evans v. Newton,'2 state park facilities were deeded to private trustees
who, in turn, denied entrance to the park to Blacks. The Supreme Court
ruled that the state was a party to the discrimination and held that
"when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or
instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limita-
tions. '
The Supreme Court's most recent statement on the parameters of
"state action" under section 1983 was in a discrimination case, Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.'4 In Moose Lodge, the petitioner, a Black, was
invited as a guest to a fraternal organization. He was refused service on
the grounds that the club's by-laws forbid service to non-whites. Irvis
argued that the state's granting of a liquor license and the regulation
exercised over the grantee was sufficient to make a private club's action
in discriminating on the basis of race "state action." The Supreme Court
disagreed, noting that the Liquor Control Board's regulations did not
encourage or play a significant part in enforcing racially discriminatory
guest policies.
The Hattell court noted that there was sharp disagreement between
jurisdictions as to whether public utility termination policies constituted
state action. In Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.' 5 and Lucas v.
Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 8 the Seventh Circuit held that a utility's
relationship with its respective public service commission did not involve
the state to a sufficient extent as to fall within the purview of "state
action" under section 1983. The Eighth Circuit in Ihrke,"7 followed by
Stanford and Bronson in other jurisdictions made contrary findings.
Hattell chose to characterize the utility's termination policies as "under
color of law" rather than follow the more restrictive approach of the
Seventh Circuit in Kadlec and Lucas.
In Kadlec, the court rejected the contention that the filing of regula-
tions by the defendant phone company and subsequent approval of them
by state administrators clothed the utility with any state authority. The
21. [T]o fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility
...is an "impossible task" which "This Court has never attempted." . . . Only by
sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
22. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
23. Id. at 299.
24. 407 U.S. 163 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Moose Lodge].
25. 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969) [hereinafter referred to as Kadlec].
26. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Lucas].
27. Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972).
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filing and approval of such regulations were deemed incidents of state
regulatory power and were designed merely to inform citizens of their
rights. The opinion added that conduct "under color of law" could
rarely be satisfied by anyone other than a state official.28 Judge Kerner,
however, in his concurring opinion, hinted that there might be situations
in which a privately owned utility company was so entwined with the
state as to characterize its conduct "under color of law." He suggested
seven factors29 in determining whether a private utility was engaging in
state action.
In Lucas, all Wisconsin utilities were required to file detailed rules
regarding their operation with the state utilities commission. The com-
missioners adopted the defendant power company's regulations. These
rules provided for termination of service five days after notice was first
given if the amount owed was not promptly paid. The court indicated
that the utility was not acting under "color of law" in threatening to
terminate service because the state's acceptance of the utility regulations
had in no way diminished the rights of the plaintiff customer, nor signifi-
cantly expanded the rights of the defendant power company.8° The
plaintiff argued that the defendant power company had a state-granted
monopoly, and thus, the defendant's rights had been substantially en-
larged. In dismissing this argument, the Seventh Circuit held that state
involvement with the entity inflicting injury upon the plaintiff was in-
sufficient to invoke fourteenth amendment protections. What was needed
was state involvement with the specific activity causing the injury. The
state's laxness in failing to require a formal hearing prior to termination
of service was state inaction and not equivalent to "state action" for
fourteenth amendment purposes.8"
The Hattell opinion distinguished Lucas, as well as cases that were
favorable to the plaintiff. In Lucas, termination of service was effected
automatically by turning off a switch. In the instant case, the power
company's agents entered upon private property to terminate service.
The utility company's powers had been enhanced because the state had
authorized trespass by the utility under certain circumstances. The
utility's assumption of a police power clearly established "state action."
lhrke, which was favorable to the plaintiff, was also subject to
28. Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 1969), citing Jobson v.
Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1966).
29. The factors which should be considered are whether 1) the entity is subject to
close regulation by a statutorily-created body . . . , 2) the regulations filed with
the regulatory body are required to be filed as a condition of the entity's operation,
3) the regulations must be approved by the regulatory body to be effective, 4) the
entity is given a total or partial monopoly by the regulatory body, 5) the regula-
tory body controls the rates charged and/or specific services offered by the entity,
6) the actions of the entity are subject to review by the regulatory body, and
7) the regulation permits the entity to perform acts which it may not otherwise
perform without violating state law.
Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1969) (concurring opinion).
30. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972).
31. Id. at 647.
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factual distinctions. In that case, the city of St. Paul benefited from
the payment of bills resulting from the utility's threatening to terminate
service. The city received five percent of the utility's gross earnings for
the right of the franchise. Though the connection between private con-
duct and state authority was not as blatant in Hattell, the plaintiff alleged
that the Colorado Power Company paid the state a flat fee for its fran-
chise. The Hattell opinion stressed that any distinction between a profit
sharing agreement and a flat fee for a franchise was meaningless, and
as the utility company was performing a public function, both were
indicators of "state action." 82
Other cases on the issue of whether privately owned public utility
practices constitute "state action" have been resolved by similar, if not
identical, reasoning to that in Hattell. In Stanford, the court found that
the defendant utility company's operations had become so entwined with
governmental control as to be state action. The court reasoned that since
a public utility performed a public function under public regulation, it
must be subject to constitutional restraints.88 In Palmer, the court em-
phasized that the defendant utility company was acting in a governmental
capacity when it exercised police power ordinarily reserved to the state.
In Palmer, as in the instant case, a statute permitted the defendant power
company to enter upon private property to terminate service. The court
reasoned that the statute evidenced that the defendant's relationship
with the government was far greater and more prevalent than that of an
ordinary business enterprise. 4 The defendant's intrusion upon private
property to suspend service was an exercise of police power. It was
analogized to a state police officer executing a writ of replevin, entering
upon private land, and depriving a person of possession of goods.,5 There
was little question that this was state action.
The Hattell opinion suggests a further reason for finding that utility
suspension policies are "under color of law." Recently, privately owned
public utilities have successfully argued that they are exempt from
Sherman Anti-Trust legislation." Their defense was not based upon the
ground that they were not monopolies, but rather that their activity is
exempt as "state action." The utilities claimed that they were monopolies
because of state policy and that their rates and practices were subjected
to meaningful state regulation. The Hattell opinion merely adopts the
utilities' defense to Sherman Anti-Trust prosecutions, thus bringing them
within the "state action" requirement of section 1983.87
In summary, Hattell and similar recent cases stand for the proposi-
32. 350 F. Supp. at 245.
33. Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, 722 (D. Kan. 1972).
34. Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241, 245 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
35. Id. at 246.
36. See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972).
37. 350 F. Supp. at 245.
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tion that municipal regulation of rates, collection practices, and termi-
nation practices may cause the utility to be so entwined with government
as to lose its private status. However, courts will not hold that merely
because a utility is pervasively regulated, any action taken by it is under
"color of law." Only those activities which are subject to state regulation
will be deemed "state action." Hattell, of necessity, was limited to the
issue of what constituted state action and did not address the question
of what was needed to conform to due process. Due process, when taken
from principle to practice, demands only that what is available to the
individual be fundamentally fair in light of the circumstances. No doubt,
implementation of due process requirements will be a fertile source of
future litigation.
JOHN D. SCHMELZER
WIRETAP EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE IN CIVIL CASES
WITHOUT CONSENT OF ONE
COMMUNICANT
A wife brought an action for the dissolution of her marriage. During
the presentation of testimony on the issue of temporary child custody, her
husband offered in evidence recordings of intercepted telephone conversa-
tions he had obtained by tapping two telephone lines coming into the
home of the parties.' The wife filed a motion to suppress the intercepted
wire communications,2 but the trial court denied the motion.8 On appeal,
the District Court of Appeal, First District, reversing the trial court,
held that the statutory and constitutional law of the State of Florida
precludes the admissibility of intercepted wire communications unless the
interception be by consent of one of the parties to the conversation, or by
authorization of a court of competent jurisdiction.4 The Florida Supreme
Court held, affirmed: The decision of the district court is adopted with
the addition that the statute in question5 makes no exception which allows
the admission of wiretap evidence in domestic relation cases in which
neither party to the communication has consented to the interception.
Markham v. Markham, 272 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1973).
1. The husband and wife owned, as tenants by the entireties, the marital home. One
of the telephones tapped was listed in the husband's name. The second telephone in the
home is an extension of a phone installed in the "Nancy Markham School of Dance."
2. The wife relied on the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518 (1970), and FLA. STAT. § 934.06 (1971).
3. The trial judge preserved to the wife the right to object to portions of the recordings
only on grounds of relevancy or materiality.
4. Markham v. Markham, 265 So.2d 59 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1972). In light of the supreme
court's adoption by reference of the district court of appeal's decision, citation to portions
of the case herein will be to the district court's opinion.
S. FLA. STAT. § 934.01 (1971).
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